

# No turning back

2025 Outlook: midyear review

July 2025





Help clients build more efficient, resilient and sustainable supply chains

# Our vision


.... focusing on geopolitical, regulatory, economic and operational disruptors

... through advisory engagements and insights



#### **Our service lines**

Bringing together actionable insights in service of global supply chains






## 2025 outlook: costs multiply

Global trade	Global geopolitics	Sourcing and production
A looming trade war	A new disrupted normal	A delicate return to growth  Tariff impact uncertainties
**Increasing costs**	**Increasing costs**	**Increasing costs**

#### Section I








## Global economy in the early stages of a structural transformation

As US trade policy uncertainty eases, the effects of tariffs will hit in H2 2025



#### **Key points**

What to expect in H2 2025...


- Global growth downgraded based rising tariffs and slower growth in Advanced Economies
- US weakness in H1 from cyclical slowdown and peak policy uncertainty; tariff headwinds to hit in H2
- China pushing against multiple headwinds, requires continued stimulus to meet growth targets
- Europe's economy remains sluggish: Germany is stagnant and France's growth is sub 1%; military spending a marginal boost post-2025.


Source: Oxford Economics, Onyx



## Tariffs create marginal upward pressure on US inflation

Slower global growth alleviates price pressure in emerging markets





Source: Oxford Economics, Bloomberg, Onyx





## Return of sourcing cost pressure in Southeast Asia and Mexico


China stuck in a deflationary cycle; Europe improving cost competitiveness

#### **Producer price inflation**

YoY % Change, Producer Price Index







Source: Oxford Economics, Onyx



## Investment trends point to wide diversification in response

Inbound investments to China decline, Middle East a key focus

European investors diversify widely

Chinese investment diversifies

Nearshoring accelerating except China

Investments by source and destination, % change in number of projects 2019-24


		DESTINATION						
		US	Adv. Europe	Emerg Europe	Amer ex-US	China	Asia ex- China	ME & Africa
	US		-18	7	3	-55	23	65
SOURCE	Adv Europe	-7	21	3	10	-48	8	64
	China 2	-7	21	-29	64		-6	36
	Asia ex- China	-18	-1	5	32	-53	31	149
	ME & Africa	5	37	20	-1	139	-3	80

Source: GlobalData, Onyx



## Global trade already reflecting that diversification

Outbound by region, average % growth per year, 2019-24



Source: TradeMap, Onyx



## Geopolitics point towards looser air and ocean markets in H2

However, expect better capacity management and continued policy-driven volatility



Air Market	Market Direction
<ul> <li>Consumer spending slowing in H2 due to cyclical trends and global trade war</li> <li>Tariff-induced volatility continues but less pronounced</li> <li>US de minimis policy changes reduce e-commerce growth</li> <li>EU regulation of Chinese e-commerce platforms</li> <li>Shein/Temu shifting business model to forward stock</li> </ul>	
<ul> <li>Supply</li> <li>Global capacity is up 3% annually, with higher growth Europe-to-Asia</li> <li>Recovery of passenger business is bringing more belly-hold capacity into the market</li> <li>Dedicated freighters deployed on high-demand lanes</li> <li>Indefinite Red Sea closure</li> </ul>	
<b>OVERALL:</b> Market looks mostly balanced, slow demand growth and modest supply growth point towards more of the same through H2	

Ocean Market	Market Direction
<ul> <li>Atypical demand pattern in H1 replaced with weak demand in H2, led by slowing consumer spending in the US</li> <li>Container volumes expected to grow 2-3% in 2025, decelerating from 4.5% growth in 2024</li> <li>Inventory drawdown after H1 build-up</li> </ul>	
<ul> <li>Supply</li> <li>Capacity to increase 6% in 2025, down from 10.3% in 2024</li> <li>Red Sea continues to absorb capacity, but this is unchanged</li> <li>New shipping alliances are expected to better manage excess capacity</li> <li>US fees on Chinese ships affects costs and routing</li> </ul>	
<b>OVERALL:</b> Market will experience global overcapacity through the end of H2	<b>—</b>

### Section II

# **Global Trade**



## Despite complexity, Trump admin continues to shore up protections

Economic security agreements at forefront of many discussions, likely looking to box out China

#### **Status of negotiations** Simplified tariff overview based on status In discussions % of US imports, 2024 **Baseline tariffs Country tariffs Sector tariffs** Argentina Australia Bangladesh Quotas, exemptions Tier-specific rates **Completed deal** Brazil Cambodia Canada Alum. & steel Reciprocal 47% In discussion Automotive EU + 25% paused? China ■ 10% baseline EU Critical minerals Broad de minimis India Pharma removal 2027 Reciprocal Timber & lumber Indonesia No substantial discussions Aug 1 Israel Aerospace Copper Japan Mexico Semis, equip. Issue specific **China (including HK, Macao)** 14% S. Korea 301 maritime Fentanyl Sri Lanka De minimis Switzerland Thailand 28% **USMCA** USMCA, auto, and 10% exemptions Vietnam Source: Trademap, Onyx



## A tiered strategy is emerging













## High dependence on US leaves little room to maneuver

Both countries continue to push for product-specific relief in the run-up to 2026 USMCA discussions

## **Key priorities of Mexico** and Canada

- Sector-specific
- exemptionsFocus on China
- USMCA maintenance
- Diversification

#### **Scope of negotiations**

- Economic security
- Defense
- Non-tariff barriers
- Investment
- Border
- Protected industries
- Labor

#### **Next steps**

- Action vis-à-vis China
- Sector negotiations
- USMCA renegotiations







## EU likely to agree to a baseline tariff, may face transshipment rate

Economic security and protectionism in politically important sectors may still cause escalation

#### **Key priorities of the EU**


- Defense commitments
- 10% tariff goal
- Sector-specific exemptions
- Strategic autonomy

#### **Scope of negotiations**

- Chinese investment
- Sector exemptions (e.g. steel)
- Digital service tax
- Purchases
- Defense

#### Next steps

- Framework w/ many unresolved issues
- Likely exemptions
  - Medical
  - Aircraft
  - Spirits










## US leverage is substantially diminished without the EU

Broader strategic goals, including finding consumers and manufacturing, also hindered











## China and US in strategic pause, no sign of broader discussions

Both countries focus on shoring up "support" and positioning

#### **Key priorities of China**

Slow US decoupling

- Prevent broader isolation
- Preclude extreme tariffs

#### **Scope of negotiations**

- Critical minerals
- Export controls (e.g. tech)
- Phase One commitments

# Next steps and likelihood of agreement

- China reacts to US pressure with retaliations likely
- Risk of escalation, esp. post-Nov







## SEA is unlikely to receive major concessions due to Chinese inputs

Trade imbalance, effort to stem trade diversions are major issues in discussion

# Vietnam

#### Malaysia

## Thailand

#### Pending:\*

- 20% all goods
- 40% trade diversion
- US duty free

#### Scope:

- Trade diversion
- Chinese investment
- Semiconductors
- Export restrictions
- Purchases
- Digital tax

#### Scope:

- Trade diversion
- Chinese investment
- Agriculture, automotives, energy
- Purchases



\* Awaiting official announcement, details





## India's high barriers leave it overall less exposed

Pharma exports and local value content are main sticking points

**Key priorities of India** 

Scope of negotiations

Next steps and likelihood of agreement

- Win US business from China
- Lower tariff level than regional peers
- Protect sensitive sectors

- Chinese investment
- Agriculture, pharma
- Local value content
- Export restrictions
- Purchases


- BRICS +10%?
- Sector exemptions?
- Potential Aug 1 tariffs, but deal likely





## Partners are wary of both China and US

Attempts to force countries to "choose sides" is resulting in countries doubling down on diversification




Source: WITS, Onyx

#### Section III



# Geopolitical shocks and supply chains: beyond 2025





## Short- to long-term challenges from policy pressure

Strategic choices and customer focus

#### **Immediate**

**Inventory prepositioning** 

Bid management and renegotiations

#### **Medium-run**

Network redesign: new routes

**Inventory management** 

**Strategic compliance** 

#### **Long-term**

"Regionalization" (FTAs)

Reshoring



## **Emerging supply chain models**

#### **STAY THE COURSE**

## SELF-CONTAIN REGIONS

#### **GO FOR THE MIDDLE**

# What you must believe

- Tariffs temporary
- Cost control

- Tariffs permanent
- Not just US

Other regions will strengthen ties

#### **Constraints**

 Price-sensitive demand

- Capex and lead times
- Geopolitical tensions



## Geopolitical fault lines worsening in the meanwhile

Stronger trend towards escalation

Current trend

GEOPOLITICAL FAULT LINE	DE-ESCALATION	STATUS QUO	ESCALATION
RUSSIA- UKRAINE			<ul> <li>One or both parties sees complete victory as a matter of survival</li> <li>Balance of military resources tilts in favor of one of the parties</li> </ul>
SOUTH CHINA SEA		<ul> <li>Claims remain unresolved, but economic cooperation takes precedence</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>US security umbrella faulters</li> <li>One or more parties believes it can prevail with acceptable economic</li> </ul>
CHINA-TAIWAN		<ul> <li>Independence not pressed publicly</li> </ul>	costs
ISRAEL-HAMAS			<ul> <li>Israeli military aims include other countries in the region, esp. Iran, Lebanon, Syria</li> <li>Conflict widens to include unresolved issues in other countries in the region</li> </ul>



## South China Sea/Taiwan: critical aspects for consideration

Most analysts consider 2027 as the start of a period of high likelihood of action

Recent experience in the Red Sea shows that a mere blockade would already disrupt trade US involvement is unclear - willingness to concede on Taiwan vs focus on keeping trade lanes open

**But sanctions are probable** 



## Recap: The South China Sea is a complex web of competing claims

East China **Overview of territorial claims** SENKAKU/DIAOYU ISLANDS **PRATAS** CHINA ISLANDS TAIWAN Philippine MYANMAR **PACIFIC** Sea LAOS South OCEAN HAINAN MACCLESFIELD China BANK PARACEL THAILAND **ISLANDS** SCARBOROUGH SHOAL CAMBODIA **Nation Claiming Area** VIETNAM , PHILIPPINES -- China Taiwan **Philippines** INDIAN SPRATLY -- Vietnam **OCEAN ISLANDS** -- Malaysia MALAYSIA -- Japan Approximate 300 location of island(s)\* INDONESIA MILES

Six main claimants involved, ranging from deeply involved (CN, VN, PH, TW) to so far neutral (MY)

External issues pulling other countries into dispute (TH - Mekong Delta, ID - North Natuna Sea)

Source: NPR, Onyx

Deeply interconnected

with China's claim over


Taiwan

## Is de-risking really de-risked? Russia-Russia-China EU/NATO North Korea South Middle China East Sea Taiwan India-China 2023 % medium and high-tech merchandise in total exports



## New spheres may limit global chains

- US block?
- US to non-aligned?
- Other middle powers
- China to non-aligned?
- China block?



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